We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.
Introduction
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in order to win a prize. The resources expended by players determine their probability of winning a prize. In this article we construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information. We consider a simple two-player contest where, contingent upon winning or losing, a player receives different prizes. Players' outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival.
1 This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels.
The rent-seeking contest literature originated with Tullock (1980) . In this model, player 's probability of winning is , / , where and are the efforts of players and . The function, , , that maps efforts into probabilities of winning is called the contest success function (CSF). The most popular versions of the Tullock CSF are the lottery ( = 1) and the all-pay auction ( ∞). 2 There are several reasons why Tullock's CSF is widely employed. First, a number of studies have provided axiomatic justification for it (Skaperdas 1996; Clark and Riis 1998) . Second, Baye and Hoppe (2003) have identified conditions under which a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games are strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest.
Economists often use modified payoffs in the Tullock contest in order to address specific research questions. For example, Skaperdas and Gan (1995) restrict the losing payoff to study the effect of risk aversion in a "limited liability" contest. Cohen and Sela (2005) restrict the winning payoff to show that in certain contests a weaker contestant can win with higher probability than a stronger contestant. Many other studies use modified payoffs in the Tullock contest, a short list of example includes Chung (1996) , Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) , Lee and Kang (1998) , Amegashie (1999) , Glazer and Konrad (1999) , Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) , Grossman and Mendoza (2001) , Öncüler and Croson (2005) , and Matros and Armanios (2009) .
In this article we propose a generalized Tullock contest in which payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. Our model nests a number of the existing contests in the literature and also provides a framework for studying new contests. One of the main motivations for introducing a generalized structure is the fact that in many real life contests payoffs are endogenous, i.e., payoffs depend both on the individual and on the rival's effort. For example, in innovation contests one firm's R&D effort may provide information spillovers that benefit its rival (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al. 1992) . In a patent race the expenditure of a rival can decrease the patent value for the winner, creating a negative spillover (Alexeev and Leitzel 1996) . Negative spillovers are often observed in military conflicts between countries (Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2000) or in biological survival contests (Baker 1996) . Another example where spillovers are important is litigation (Farmer and Pecorino 1999; Baye et al. 2005) . Depending on the litigation system, losers have to compensate winners for a portion of their legal expenditures or up to the amount actually spent by the loser. These create either negative or positive spillover effects of one party's expenditure on another. Baye et al. (2010) model the spillovers in terms of an all-pay auction contest. We explicitly model such spillovers in the context of a Tullock lottery contest. 
Theoretical model
We consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players are denoted by and .
Both players value the winning prize as 0 and the losing prize as . We assume that winning the prize provides higher valuation than losing, i.e., . Players simultaneously expend irreversible and costly efforts 0 and 0. The probability of player winning the contest is described by a Tullock lottery CSF:
Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival:
, with probability ,
where , are cost parameters, and , are spillover parameters. To ensure that a player has no incentive to expend infinite effort, we impose conditions that a player's own effort has a negative direct impact on his winning payoff and a non-positive direct impact on his losing payoff, that is, 0 and 0.
We define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ , , Ω , where Ω , , , , , is the parameter space. All parameters in Ω along with the CSF are common knowledge for both players. The players are assumed to be risk neutral; therefore, for a given effort pair , , the expected payoff for player in contest Γ , , Ω is:
,
where , 0,0 . For 0, the expected payoff is , /2. By setting , , and , expression (3) can be rewritten as:
Player 's best response is derived by maximizing , with respect to .
Differentiating equation (4) with respect to yields the following first order condition:
The second order condition is:
From the second order condition (6) it is easy to verify that the payoff function for player is concave as long as:
If (7) holds then first order condition is necessary and sufficient for maximizing player 's payoff. Consequently by solving (5) for and by substituting back the values of and , we receive the best response function of in terms of the effort choice of :
if / ; and 0, otherwise. 4 It is clear that the best response function (8) depends on , , the difference between and , and the spread between the winning and the losing prize valuations.
By simultaneously solving best response functions (8), and accounting for symmetric Nash equilibrium we obtain the unique equilibrium in which player and expend efforts of (9) The expected equilibrium payoff in the symmetric equilibrium is given by:
Both the non-negative equilibrium effort condition and the second order condition hold if 3 0. Furthermore, to ensure that both players are willing to expend positive efforts in equilibrium the equilibrium payoff has to be greater than or equal to the payoff of losing, i.e., . This condition translates into 0 and it means that the unit cost of winning has to be lower than the unit spillover benefit from losing.
Existing contests in the literature

Contests without spillovers
In the standard contest defined by Tullock ( The best response function for player is (Figure 1) . Under the symmetric equilibrium we have /3. (2000) consider a case in which two players compete to win a war. In this game player and have resource endowments of and which they can use to win the contest. The winner receives the sum of resources minus the sum of efforts expended by both players. It is also assumed that war destroys a fraction 1 0,1 of the total payoff.
Garfinkel and Skaperdas
Thus, the needed restrictions are , , and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The best response function is ( Figure 1, where 2 ). Although and can be different, the equilibrium efforts for players and are the same, i.e., /4.
Contests with spillovers
A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) contest with positive spillovers can be captured by Γ , , , 0, 1, 1, , 0 , where 0,1 is the degree of spillover. The corresponding best response function is / 1 and the symmetric equilibrium efforts are / 4 1 . Similarly, a contest of Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) , where the value of the winning prize decreases with the total effort expenditures, can be Interestingly enough, when we restrict the parameters to match their model, the best response function / is independent of the value of . Note that when 1 (i.e., the case of American, Marshall, and Quayle systems of litigation), the best response function as well as the symmetric equilibrium turns out to be qualitatively equivalent to that in Tullock (1980) .
Similarly, the two-player versions of other contests by Farmer and Pecorino (1998) , Lee and Kang (1998) , Amegashie (1999), Glazer and Konrad (1999) , Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) , Grossman and Mendoza (2001) , and Matros and Armanios (2009) can be obtained from our generalized contest by placing appropriate parameter restrictions.
New contests
Contests without spillovers
In a standard Tullock contest the unit cost of losing is the same as the unit cost of winning. However, in many real life situations we observe that the winner of the contest pays less than the loser. A prominent example is the government procurement auction for defense weapons. Different companies make costly investments to produce prototypes and the government shares the prototype's production cost with only the winner. 5 In these cases, the winner of the contest faces lower marginal cost than the loser. Rightfully, this contest can be called a 'lazy winner' contest. We can capture this by setting 0, 0 and other parameters in Ω to zero. Therefore, the payoff for player is given by , with probability , with probability 1 ,
The resulting best response function is / and the symmetric equilibrium effort levels are / 3 .
Contests with spillovers
Next, we consider an 'input spillover' contest where the effort expended by player j partially benefits player and vice versa. This case can be interpreted as the input spillover effect in R&D innovation (Kamien et al., 1992 ). In our model we assume that the winner (loser) of the contest receives a benefit proportional to the loser's (winner's) effort. After setting 1, and 0 the payoff function of 'input spillover' contest takes the form:
, with probability , with probability 1 ,
where 0, 0, and 4.
[ Figure 2 is about here]
Note that the best response function, , changes dramatically with and . The symmetric equilibrium effort of this contest is given by / 4 . Hence, a player expends more (less) effort with an increase in the spillover benefit from winning (losing). Figure 2 displays best response functions and resulting equilibria for different values of and . As we move left to right, decreases, and the total effort expended also decreases. This has a simple intuition: if the positive externality gained by losing increases relative to that of winning then the players will spend less effort to win the contest. This case resembles R&D contests in countries where property rights are not protected by the government and the spillover in case of losing is very large. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to free ride on the effort of the others.
Discussion
In this article we construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information. We show how different existing contests in the literature can be nested under this generalized structure. We also characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different equilibrium effort levels. Finally, we introduce and characterize two new contests to the literature. Our results can be applied to the fields of labor economics, law and economics, industrial organization, public economics, and political economy. By applying certain parameter restrictions to our model one can also imitate the rentseeking contests, patent races, military combats, or legal conflicts.
There are a number of interesting extensions of our analysis. For example, one can use our generalized structure to meet a given objective of a contest designer. This objective varies between contests. In sports or social benefit programs the designer may want to maximize the total expenditures of effort, whereas in rent-seeking or electoral contests the designer may want to minimize them. For a given objective, one can appropriately set the parameters of our model so that the desired outcome is achieved. Other extensions include contests with more than two players, the effects of risk aversion and incomplete information. Finally, it would be interesting to test empirically the predictions of our generalized contest model. In particular, our analysis demonstrates that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different equilibrium effort levels. To test these predictions, one could design an experiment similar to Sheremeta (2010a Sheremeta ( , 2010b . We leave these questions for future research. 
